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Like any professional, I often get asked, “So what do you do?” When I explain 
to people that I am a philosopher, they are always blown away. I take it that they 
have not met many philosophers and so I stand before them as a rare breed, 
perhaps even an endangered species. “So what do you do?” is usually followed 
by another question; the same question. Although they are impressed that I am 
a philosopher they cannot really understand what it is that I do. Recently I was 
asked if I did philosophy “like that other guy.” I said, “Yes.” My inquirer was still 
confused. He could not connect the dots. Although he understood my aca-
demic pursuits (I said I write and teach), he could not understand how I could 
do philosophy and do anything meaningful or relevant. Days later, I was told by 
someone pursuing a doctoral degree in another department, but quite familiar 
with the philosophy department, that, “it is a privilege for philosophers to just 
think about stuff.” For her, we philosophers are privileged to make a career of 
disengaging from the world in order to think and this disengagement makes no 
contribution to the real world.
Although my mother taught me a long time ago not to be concerned about 
what people think of me, I cannot forget these kinds of encounters. Sometimes 
I have similar thoughts. I, for example, often participate in a university‐wide 
collegium for fellows. My participation makes me quite privy to what other 
academics are doing in other disciplines across the university. Several of my 
science colleagues are working on more effective diagnoses and cures for 
cancers. Another humanities colleague is studying Latino identification. When 
I stand to present, I worry that what I say may sound foreign, insignificant, 
or irrelevant to them. Will they see me as out of touch with the real world?
I am not suggesting that these anecdotes are representative of what all people 
think of philosophy but it has been my experience. At times what philosophers 
do in philosophy can be viewed as out of touch with the world or at least with 




undergraduates taking philosophy courses, the closing of philosophy depart-
ments or their merging with other departments, the few philosophers who 
serve as public intellectuals, the few non‐philosophers who have access to or 
who have engaged in philosophical research, and the questions I get asked 
about the mystery of the profession. Scottish philosopher David Hume, over 
two hundred years ago, made a similar assessment of the philosopher.
The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little 
acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either 
to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from 
c ommunication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and 
notions equally remote from their comprehension.
(Hume 1975, 8)
Not all philosophers fit Hume’s description. He thought that he was doing 
p hilosophy in a radically different way attempting to make sense of human 
nature rather than ignore human beings. Still, the perception of philosophy 
Hume rebuked is commonly expressed. In the 2015 Republican presidential 
debate, candidate Marco Rubio received applause for stating “we need more 
welders, and less philosophers.” I think things can change in philosophy. In 
order for this change to occur, professional philosophers need to seriously 
rethink how we do philosophy, where we do philosophy, and with whom we do 
philosophy. If we don’t, we may witness the decline and even the eradication of 
the field of philosophy as we know it.
David Hume claims, “abstruse philosophy … vanishes when the philosopher 
leaves the shade, and comes into open day” (1975, 7). I read Hume’s reference 
to “leaving the shade” as saying that the complicated, otherworldly, and out‐of‐
touch nature of philosophy disappears when, for example, philosophers get off 
of their isolated armchairs and become accessible, speak clearly, and engage 
with the public and with other thinkers. Coming out of the shade is the act of 
philosophers leaving their philosophical bubbles. It entails: (1) making philo-
sophical work accessible in form and in medium; (2) not ghettoizing public 
philosophy but seeing it as a serious part of one’s overall academic project; 
(3) doing philosophy in a way that engages with work in science, social science, 
and the humanities; and (4) getting over the fear and suspicion of public 
engagement. In the following I offer several suggestions for how philosophers 
can come out of the shade and engage with the world.
 Accessibility in Form and Medium
Coming out of the shade requires that philosophers no longer write in an 
i naccessible language that only a few specialists can understand. It requires 
that philosophers no longer write so abstractly even if it brings with it the 
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reward that the field will label it as “brilliant” – not because they understand it, 
but because it is impenetrable. As David Hume notes, they are wrapped up in 
principles and notions that they cannot possibly understand. Even if the 
p hilosopher’s words are clear, it is also important that this clear research is 
not kept locked away in the hidden archives of philosophical journals to be 
discovered and viewed only by the few.
Philosophy prides itself on rigor. Some philosophical texts are excluded from 
the canon and some articles are rejected from journals, not because they are 
not saying anything intellectually valuable, but based on the view that they lack 
rigor. If it is not confusing (I mean rigorous) enough, philosophers at times 
question if it is even philosophy. While I think rigor is important, it does not 
equate to abstruse, inaccessible prose. A writer can be rigorous and yet be 
clear. This obsession with rigor has not only excluded certain voices but it is 
preventing philosophers from coming out of the shade –  thus limiting their 
own voices. We all want our research to be the very best it can be; for it to be 
representative of thoughtfulness and intellectual insight so that we can make a 
valuable contribution. However, just as rigor can vary in its presentation, it can 
also vary in its intention.
The obsession of some philosophers with rigor suggests intellectual postur-
ing and elitism. On this view, the more rigorous a philosopher is, the smarter 
they look. The more effort a work takes to be understood, the more intelligent 
and philosophical the philosopher seems. Since the days of ancient Greek 
thinkers, the philosopher has been perceived as special and different from the 
regular citizen. For Plato, only philosophers are fit to rule. If the unexamined 
life is not worth living, according to Socrates, then we can infer that only those 
who examine their lives (philosophers) have a life that is worth living. In Greek 
society, philosophical thinking was an activity for the wealthy because they had 
the leisure time to philosophize. Today, I think rigor has been used as a way to 
exclude others from this “special” activity; an activity that some suppose only 
they are gifted enough to understand and engage with. Instead of coming out of 
the shade, the shade has become their country club and their tent of intellectual 
apartheid that allows them to think of themselves as superior and special. 
Accessibility is a threat that puts them at risk of being like and with the people. 
The notion of accessibility reminds them that ideas are not the possession of the 
higher class; rather, they are gifts that can be shared with everyone.
Philosophy also prides itself on clarity. Philosophers, however, have a hard 
time understanding each other’s work. If philosophers are to come out of the 
shade, they must endeavor to make their work comprehensible not just to the 
public but also to those other philosophers who are not in their particular sub-
field. Let us be honest, there are several sessions we attend at philosophy con-
ferences in which we have no idea what is being talked about. This has nothing 
to do with technical language specific to a topic. It has everything to do with 
clarity. If philosophers cannot understand each other’s work, what makes them 
think others outside of philosophy can understand it? Sadly, graduate school 
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has trained students to write in an inaccessible way. The greatest challenge for 
those wanting to come out of the shade is unlearning this bad habit – a task 
that, although necessary, is not easy.
Just creating work that can be read and understood means nothing if that 
work never has the chance to be read. The profession of philosophy must figure 
out a way to make philosophical research more available to colleagues, aca-
demics in other disciplines, and the public. Although I do not have the space to 
discuss the obstacles to doing so, I think social psychology and science journals 
offer a best practice for making research easily available.
One way of making research easily available is by not charging to read journal 
articles. This is not to say that printed journals should be free, which would 
drive them out of business. But the cost of journal articles should not be a bar-
rier to gaining access to them. “For free” is one of the best vehicles of accessibil-
ity. It removes the obstacles to reading the work. I find it easier to discover and 
read new science and social science research from journals such as Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) and on sites such as Research Gate. 
This is because once I Google search the content, I am able to read the articles 
for free. When the articles do charge, they have brief free windows. Philosophy 
articles, however, are often locked behind paywalls, with some articles costing 
the price of books. These articles are not easily accessible to philosophers let 
alone to the public. Some philosophers have found a way to get around this by 
creating Facebook groups where they share articles with each other that some 
cannot afford, or articles their institutions’ libraries do not provide. But such 
groups for philosophers are rarely open to non‐philosophers.
Cost is not the only barrier to accessibility. Simply not knowing the work 
exists is also a barrier. When a science or social science article is published, 
universities’ public relations and communications departments inform the 
press of this exciting research by issuing special‐direct‐to‐media press releases 
about professors’ research. It is not surprising that I am first made aware of 
science and social science articles via NPR, CNN, or by perusing popular sci-
ence magazines and blogs. When philosophical work is published in journals, it 
is not well publicized like in other disciplines. As a result, the work tends to 
remain hidden from the world. I am surprised when popular media outlets ref-
erence new research by philosophers. When David Brooks, columnist for The 
New York Times, referenced philosopher Laurie Paul’s work on transformative 
experience in his August 2015 article “The Big Decisions,” I was so proud and 
surprised. How often does that happen? Not very often. Paul claims that sales of 
her book increased as a result. The mention of her research made others outside 
the discipline much more aware and interested in her work. How awesome is 
that! I am not suggesting that all published work will be viewed as interesting, 
but no one will consider its value if we are not first made aware of it.
Making people aware of philosophy research should not be the responsibil-
ity of universities alone but also of journals and philosophers themselves. 
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For all the time it takes to accept and publish work, just as much time should 
be put into publicizing the work to those in and outside the philosophy profes-
sion. But the responsibility should not end with journals. I know marketing is 
not in a philosopher’s job description or a skill that philosophers pick up in 
graduate school. Nevertheless, philosophers should be open to sharing their 
research with those beyond their small subfield. Academics have the freedom 
to post their journal articles and book chapters on their private websites. 
(This will require that they first come out of the shade and create an online 
presence.) If journal articles on websites are only linked to PhilPapers.org for 
citation purposes but the actual articles themselves are not linked, then that is 
a clear sign that the philosopher is still comfortable with being in the shade. 
Philosophers can also take advantage of Twitter, along with sites like Academia.
edu, as a vehicle for sharing research.
Writing academic research in a clear way and making it available to others is 
not the only way to make philosophy accessible. Philosophers can also present 
their findings in popular mediums like blogs and newspapers, and participate 
in radio and television debates and conversations. The profession calls this 
“public philosophy,” to which we now turn.
 A Note on “Public” Philosophy
Some philosophers, like me, have taken advantage of blogs, podcasts, book 
series, newspapers, and magazines such as The New York Times’s “The Stone” 
column, The Philosophers’ Magazine, Open Court’s Popular Culture Series, 
Philosophy Bites, The UnMute Podcast, Philosophy Talk, Daily Nous blog, the 
Guardian’s philosophy section, and The Partially Examined Life podcast, to 
name a few, as a way to share their philosophical ideas in an accessible way with 
the world. On this definition, public philosophy is not about content but rather 
about style. One does not have to talk about public issues to do public philoso-
phy. A philosopher can write about the mind or about math but the way in 
which she writes and the medium she uses to disseminate this content will 
determine if it’s “public” philosophy.
While I have used the term to describe some of the work I do, I find the term 
odd. There is no such thing as “public English,” “public math,” or “public psy-
chology.” Mathematicians do math and share their findings with the world. 
Psychologists do psychological research and share it with the world. Why can’t 
we just do philosophy and share it with the world without some special name 
for it? Perhaps the very term “public” philosophy reveals what some really 
think about philosophy; that it is about exchanging and debating ideas rigor-
ously and only with other professional philosophers. Anything beyond this 
requires a special name to ensure that this accessible stuff is not confused 
with “real” philosophy. While philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
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centuries spoke to the public, philosophers today speak only to each other. 
It is understandable why some view philosophy as lacking social importance.
Some who see no harm in writing accessible philosophy may nonetheless 
argue that philosophers should not do too much “public” philosophy. On this 
view, what is more serious, intellectual, and important is strict academic writ-
ing. I do not want to dismiss this worry. Tenure is based on articles and book 
publications, not “public” philosophy. If philosophers want to be promoted and 
advance in the field, they are obliged to focus on these kinds of publications. 
However, while this is the institutional expectation, it may also be the problem. 
Our own individual advancement may be contributing to the irrelevance and 
eradication of the philosophy field.
This attitude to “public” philosophy has ghettoized accessible philosophy so 
severely that tenured and famous philosophers are urged not to dabble in it too 
much. This urging is a retreat into the elitist domain. Consider Cornel West. 
In the early 2000s while at Harvard University, then Harvard president, Larry 
Summers, criticized West for spending too much time doing public philoso-
phy. Years later West was similarly criticized by Michael Eric Dyson in a 
New Republic article. Dyson (2014) argues that
the last several years revealed West’s paucity of serious and fresh intel-
lectual work, a trend far longer in the making. West is still a Man of 
Ideas, but those ideas today are a vain and unimaginative repackaging of 
his earlier hits. He hasn’t published without aid of a co‐writer a single 
scholarly book since Keeping Faith, which appeared in 1993, the same 
year as Race Matters.
Without commenting on the soundness of Summers’ and Dyson’s criticisms, 
it’s interesting to hear them make the distinction between, and make claims 
regarding, the comparative value of “serious” scholarly work and public work. 
For them, the public work West has done does not count as something “a jug-
gernaut of the academy and an intellectual icon among the black masses” should 
focus on too much (Dyson 2014). While we may criticize West and other “pub-
lic philosophers” for taking time to do public philosophy –  time some claim 
could be dedicated to more serious academic work – let us not forget that some 
of the most brilliant philosophers of the past and present have come out of the 
shade in a similar manner to West. They include Bertrand Russell, Karl Marx, 
Jürgen Habermas, Ayn Rand, William James, Michael Sandel, Martha 
Nussbaum, and many more. Their public engagement did not take, and has not 
taken, away from their brilliance. I would argue that it added to it.
These and other thinkers remind us that new ideas are worth spreading. 
A wider audience would love to learn what philosophers have to say, if only 
they could hear and understand it. Philosophical engagement is enriched when 
it engages with the public and with other thinkers outside of philosophy.
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 Engaging with Other Disciplines
Philosophers tend to focus on questions that cannot be settled empirically and 
I think this is what makes philosophy unique. Philosophers focus on the ques-
tions for which humans cannot find the answers from empirical research. 
Nonetheless, there has been openness to empirical study in philosophy 
although it differs in kind and degree from engagement with work in the 
humanities and sciences. In what follows I explain how engagement with work 
outside of philosophy is not only a way to come out of the shade, but is a great 
resource for philosophical research.
Philosophy is improved when it engages with other thinkers outside of phi-
losophy. Immanuel Kant notes that “ought implies can” but if we do not know 
what we can do (an empirical question), we cannot know what we ought to do 
(a normative question). This requires engagement with disciplines beyond our 
own canon. Neglecting this engagement can leave philosophers misinformed 
and out of touch. If philosophers make claims such as “we are all responsible 
for our actions” and ignore or are ignorant of scientific work on psychopaths or 
social science work on environmental nurture, they will end up making claims 
that are uninformed and mistaken.
To claim in classrooms that becoming virtuous is rare, and yet fail to explain 
how social structures can modify our ethical behavior, doesn’t make just for an 
out‐of‐touch philosophy course, but for a normative ethical claim that loses its 
persuasive force. Ethics can benefit from psychology and neuroscience. Social 
and political philosophy can benefit from social psychology and economics. 
Philosophy of mind can benefit from cognitive science. But in order for this to 
happen, philosophers must engage with these thinkers. I am not arguing that 
these other fields are superior. I am claiming, instead, that coming out of the 
shade and engaging with other thinkers can strengthen philosophical claims 
and also make our work much more accessible. The days of doing philosophy 
while relying only on philosophy have to be done away with. “Interdisciplinary” 
is not a dirty word! Philosophers can remain true to traditional modes of 
q uestioning as well as to their particular traditions and still engage seriously 
with other thinkers.
As we talk about engaging with other thinkers, it is usually the scientists 
or the social scientists who get the most attention. I think that philosophers 
should also engage with work in the humanities, particularly history and 
literature. These disciplines are just as valuable as the sciences. History is a 
discipline that studies past events and human affairs. It too is rich with valu-
able content. When David Hume criticizes religion he doesn’t just rely on 
moral psychology but draws on historical atrocities to strengthen his argu-
ment. When ethicist Macalester Bell or political philosophers Bernard Boxill 
and Tommie Shelby analyze self‐respect, they don’t just appeal to psycho-
logical notions but borrow the historical account of Frederick Douglass 
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fighting against his slave master, Covey, to illustrate their points. These 
philosophers bring true experiences and thereby life into their examples, 
providing a persuasiveness that their arguments would lack if they only 
relied on a fictitious “Sally and Bill” example constructed in their philo-
sophical shade.
Literature is usually about imaginary events and people, but while the 
stories might not be true, they are representative of the human condition. 
Amir Jaima argues in Questionable Form: An Inquiry into the Relationship 
Between Philosophy and Literature that fiction provides aesthetic knowl-
edge, which consists of knowledge of sensations, embodied experiences, 
and emotions. Jaima notes that fiction, like philosophy, does not aspire to 
be true. It aspires to be persuasive. It is the persuasive accounts of aesthetic 
experiences that enthrall and convince the reader. Speaking of philosophy 
and literature, Jaima notes, “the primary goal is insight … a compelling and 
edifying picture of the world, or a call to arms” (Jaima 2014, 148). Jaima 
recommends that we widen what we consider the philosophical canon. 
Even if we are hesitant about accepting his claim here, we should at least 
widen our notion of whom we should engage with. How powerful would it 
have been for John Rawls to come out of the shade and use James Baldwin’s 
Go Tell It On the Mountain or Richard Wright’s Native Son as a resource? 
How enriched would Robert Nozick’s later work have been if he had used 
Toni Morrison’s Beloved?
Philosophers can also make use of the tools of these thinkers. In the first few 
chapters of her Upheaval of Thought (2003), Martha Nussbaum spends time 
explaining the nature of emotions by analyzing grief. Instead of sticking to the 
universal she draws from her own experience of her mother’s sickness and 
eventual death. It reads like compelling, creative non‐fiction. I cried while 
reading the chapter because her narrative provided the ultimate example, the 
ultimate proof, to her argument. I could relate to her grief. As I read her 
account, I could recall my own mother’s death. As Aristotle points out, such 
examples become a source of something universal. I was reading a philosophi-
cal text that showed me my own experience. The narrative elicited my emotions 
while I was learning about the nature of an emotion. That text was brought to 
life for me that day because it was full of life. Her argument was more accessible 
because of her use of narrative: a tool mastered by novelists and non‐fiction 
writers.
Philosophy can come out of the shade through its engagement with scien-
tific, historical, and literary thinkers and even through the use of their tools. In 
doing so, philosophers not only leave their isolated comfort zones as they 
engage with thinkers outside of philosophy but they bring life into their work, 
making it all the more compelling. Not all engagement is as harmless and 
s imple as consulting with other academics and intellectual thinkers. Coming 
out of the shade may require engagement that is risky and scary.
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 Suspicion and Fear of the Public
I have talked with several philosophers who have received invitations to offer 
their philosophical perspective on national television. Some have been very 
suspicious of the invitations. Their reasons to decline have ranged from the 
questionable views and history of the host to the views of the person they 
would be debating with. These philosophers were concerned that they were 
being set up, and they worried about the outcomes of their participation. I am 
sympathetic to this concern. The worst thing you want to happen on national 
television is to be set up to fail. It is already a scary and nerve‐racking thing to 
share your thoughts on live television. You want it to end well and for it to be 
productive. No one wants to be a laughing stock or be used as a tool to perpetu-
ate a hidden agenda. We should be careful about the public decisions we make 
regarding our participation on news networks.
Although I am sympathetic, I am also concerned that this suspicion is 
becoming an all‐too‐common first response to such invitations. It immediately 
prevents philosophers from this kind of engagement, keeping them in the 
shade for another day. It is not surprising that I am first made aware of science 
and social science articles via CNN or National Public Radio, or by perusing 
popular science magazines and blogs. I do not know if this lack of trust would 
exist if the debater or host were another philosopher. If so, our suspicion of 
non‐philosophers – no matter their position – is unfair. But it is hard, if not 
impossible, to predict what we would do or how we would feel if the facts were 
different. The question is how to deal with this suspicion and fear.
Coming out of the shade is not easy. It will require courage – the courage 
to speak our truth and spread our ideas for the public to hear despite not 
being in control of how others will spin it. Some of us are comfortable speak-
ing to small groups. If someone disagrees with us at a conference talk, even 
in a rude manner, we have learned ways to work around it. What philoso-
phers may not be used to is this occurring on the national stage: a place where 
not everyone is playing according to the rules of the academy or within the 
terms of civility. The fight may not seem fair. I am sure all academics have had 
this concern but it has not deterred every academic from participating in 
televised conversations. Perhaps they have taken the position that if they 
don’t speak, who will?
We need to hear from philosophers not because they are special but because 
they have a different perspective. It’s not important if philosophers agree with 
the hosts, panelists, or the network. What is important is providing insight. 
How the media interprets it and uses it, is not under one’s control. However, 
let us not think that this occurs only with news networks. This lack of control 
of people’s response occurs with academic writing too. If philosophers can 
handle graduate school, dissertation defenses, journal debates, conference 
questions, argumentative writing, author‐meets‐critics sessions, and the 
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constant criticism that is endemic in philosophy; I believe philosophers 
have the chops to chat it up with figures like Fox News’s Bill O’Reilly or CNN’s 
Don Lemon.
Let us now talk about issues of safety and fear. Another thing that steers 
philosophers away from coming out of the shade is the rude, aggressive, and 
unpoliced responses that can come from the public. One philosopher explained 
to me that, after doing a public lecture, she received a death threat. For her 
family’s protection, she decided that this kind of public work was not worth the 
risk to her safety. Several philosophers I know, particularly minorities, have 
reported name‐calling I cannot repeat here as well as death threats, in response 
to what they have written. These attacks are a tool for silencing. The anony-
mous comment sections of websites are different from the civility philosophers 
may encounter in the profession.
I am in no way advocating that we should sacrifice our own peace of mind 
and even our own safety in order to advance our philosophical ideas. We do 
not need twenty‐first‐century Socratic martyrdom. For philosophers who want 
to opt out of this kind of engagement, staying in the shade is not the only 
option. Philosophers can still come out of the shade by writing in an accessible 
way, by spreading their research, and by engaging with thinkers outside of 
philosophy. But for those who want to write and speak in more public venues, 
please know that it requires the strength to ignore negativity, the power to 
focus on the many your work has helped and not the few your work has 
angered, and the will to “write on” despite incivility.
Philosophers, make your work accessible, engage with other thinkers, and 
perhaps even write for public venues like blogs or offer your insight to TV viewers. 
It’s time you came out of the shade no matter how cool and comfortable you 
think it is. The sun is brighter on the other side!
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